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by Jagdish Bhagwati 
Although the debate over the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will be loud 
and distracting, its passage seems assured, albeit 
with some tougher environmental and labor 
standards. It is time, then, for President Bill 
Clinton to plan his next, critical step on trade. 
He must now decide whether to continue with 
a free trade area (FTA) approach, be it global or 
confined to the Americas, or to throw his 
weight exclusively behind a multilateral ap- 
proach based on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Unfortunately, the 
president seems to be headed down the least 
attractive of those paths: the embrace of more 
regional FTAs in the Americas alone. 
The president and U.S. Trade Representative 
(USTR) Mickey Kantor have occasionally re- 
marked, without making a formal policy state- 
ment, that they would carry the NAFTA process 
southward. In a policy statement on March 30, 
1993, Larry Summers, the Treasury Depart- 
ment's assistant secretary for international af- 
fairs, supported the trade component of the 
broader Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 
which was launched in 1990. After Mexico, 
then, the Clinton administration is likely to 
embrace Chile and thus, wittingly or unwitting- 
ly, the regional FTA approach-without seri- 
ously examining the other options. 
Inertia, however, is not a sound basis for 
policy. Analysis of the choices at hand and an 
appreciation of the history of such choices are 
essential if the administration is to make such a 
momentous decision with vision and wisdom. 
Indeed, history is most enlightening on this 
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question. When GATr was crafted at the end of 
World War II, the United States was wedded 
to the cause of open, multilateral trade. It reso- 
lutely fought the British, who favored discrimi- 
nation in defense of Imperial Preference. Be- 
cause of U.S. efforts, non-discrimination be- 
came a central principle of GATr: If trade bar- 
riers were lowered for one trading partner, they 
had to be lowered for all trading partners. 
Virtually the only exception to that rule is 
found under Article 24 of GATT, which allows 
a group of countries to dismantle all trade 
barriers only among themselves. 
That was the door through which the Euro- 
pean Community (EC) passed in 1957, with 
U.S. approval. Though Americans were not at 
the time interested in Article 24 for themselves, 
the EC effort led to an outpouring of short- 
lived FTAs in the developing countries, with the 
1960 Latin American Free Trade Association 
being the most prominent. But the time was 
not yet ripe for their success. Few developing 
countries were willing to adopt a regime under 
which free trade, not planning, would regulate 
economic activity. 
In the 1960s, the use of Article 24 by the 
United States emerged as a real possibility in a 
manner that has immediate relevance today. 
Several influential economists, politicians, and 
intellectuals in Great Britain and North Ameri- 
ca came up with the proposal for a NAFTA. But 
NAFTA then stood for the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Area, which was nonregional at its incep- 
tion and meant to push outward to the Pacific 
for new members-with the United States right 
in the middle of it all. The economist Harry 
Johnson and Senator Jacob Javits (R-New 
York) were among the first NAFTA proponents. 
The 1960s NAFTA initiative, much like the 
early 1980s turn to FTAs by the United States, 
was essentially prompted by the fear that the 
GATT-based multilateral-negotiations route to 
lowering trade barriers worldwide had run its 
course. FTAs, open to new members on a non- 
regional basis, seemed to offer an alternative, 
indeed the only, route to free trade everywhere. 
Thus, at the time, there was a widespread feel- 
ing that the Kennedy Round would turn out to 
be the last opportunity under GATT to lower 
trade barriers. NAFTA proponents also viewed 
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the EC as an inward-looking customs union 
that would resist efforts to liberalize world 
trade under GATr. At the same time, Atlan- 
ticists in Britain and the United States pre- 
ferred to see Britain link its destiny with the 
United States rather than with the EC. As 
British efforts to join the EC met with French 
president Charles de Gaulle's continuing non, 
others felt that Britain might well have no op- 
tion but to turn to other initiatives. 
It is now time for America to return 
to GATT as the best means to liberalize 
world trade. 
De Gaulle's opposition to British entry was, 
of course, driven wholly by the fear that Britain 
would act as the Americans' Trojan horse with- 
in the EC, bringing in the interests and influ- 
ence of the United States and undermining the 
French policy of independence from U.S. hege- 
mony. British prime minister Harold Wilson 
recalled a 1965 cartoon from the Observer 
where a diminutive Wilson says, in short, "I 
even wake up tired!", to which a towering de 
Gaulle, a stethoscope in his ear, responds: 
"Hm. It's all those late night telephone calls to 
Washington. What you need is an independent 
policy on Vietnam." Indeed, de Gaulle made 
no secret of his suspicions about the British. 
Thus, immediately before his resounding No- 
vember 1967 rejection of British membership in 
the EC, de Gaulle had queried Wilson on 
precisely that issue. As Wilson put it: "The 
whole situation would be very different if 
France were genuinely convinced that Britain 
really was disengaging from the U.S. in all 
major matters such as defense policy and in 
areas such as Asia, the Middle East, Africa and 
Europe." 
As it happened, it was precisely the flip side 
of de Gaulle's concerns that made the Ameri- 
can government eager, for political reasons, that 
Britain join the EC and hence unenthusiastic 
about the NAFTA proposal. Britain would help 
moderate, it argued, Gaullist anti-Americanism. 
In fact, American leaders were also wary of a 
NAFTA on economic grounds because they were 
in no mood to give up on multilateralism and 
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GATT. Both Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles and Secretary of the Treasury Douglas 
Dillon had supported the European Communi- 
ty on political grounds. In 1950, the U.S. 
House of Representatives had amended the 
Economic Cooperation Act to include among 
its objectives the "economic unification of 
Europe" as part of the effort needed to restore 
Western Europe to prosperity, strengthening it 
against the Soviet menace. Both Dulles and 
Dillon opposed a Europe-wide free trade area, 
as distinct from the then six-member EC. 
Thus, any FTA that focused on free trade alone, 
as the first NAFTA was designed to do, the 
American government found unacceptable. It 
saw America's interests in multilateralism and 
non-discrimination, as typified by GATT: A 
trading regime embodying those principles 
would provide a predictable and orderly frame- 
work for trade among all countries and hence 
benefit the United States in turn. By contrast, 
the North Atlantic initiative, despite its ultimate 
objective of free trade worldwide, would have 
entailed preferences and discrimination at the 
outset. 
The 1960s NAFTA initiative then came to 
naught: The U.S. government refused to play. 
But the conjunction of factors encouraging a 
U.S. policy shift to FTAs had returned in the 
early 1980s and, this time, the United States 
changed its mind and its course. Faced with 
European refusal to start multilateral trade 
negotiations in 1982, and with growing protec- 
tionism at home that required countervailing 
moves to expand trade, the Reagan administra- 
tion initiated the talks culminating in the Cana- 
da-U.S. Free Trade Agreement now turning a 
decade later into NAFTA, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, with Mexico. 
The new NAFTA is clearly a regional FTA, 
and extending it to South America would un- 
doubtedly stamp it as regionalism par excel- 
lence. Yet, it is noteworthy that, as with the 
aborted 1960s NAFTA initiative, the policy shift 
to Article 24-blessed FrAs by the United States 
in the 1980s was not conceived as being nar- 
rowly regional in scope. When the U.S.-Cana- 
dian agreement was first negotiated, its sup- 
porters could be roughly divided into two 
camps, both of them anti-regionalist. 
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The first group, the GATT optimists, thought 
that the U.S.-Canadian agreement would push 
the EC and the developing countries into a 
new GATT round. Without the United States, 
all would realize, GATT would have little future 
and world trade would revert to the law of the 
jungle, which would be most painful to the 
weak. The strategy worked, and the American 
embrace of Article 24 through the Canada-U.S. 
FTA did indeed prompt countries to come to 
the table with the GATT Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. When complet- 
ed, the Uruguay Round will radically transform 
GATT, implementing many of the reforms for 
which the United States has been fighting over 
the last decade. According to that school of 
thought, the turn to FTAs was a tactical move 
designed to jumpstart the GATT multilateral 
negotiations. Having succeeded in doing so, it 
is now time for America to return to its origi- 
nal commitment to GATT as the best means to 
liberalize world trade. 
Inertia is not a sound basis for policy. 
A second group, the GATT pessimists, also 
favored the Canada-U.S. FTA. But much like 
the earlier proponents of the North Atlantic 
initiative, they saw FTAs as part of a global 
strategy that sought to build FTAs that were 
open-ended, not regionally exclusive. Ambassa- 
dor William Brock, the USTR in the early years 
of the Reagan administration, offered FTAs even 
to members of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations. He would have no doubt of- 
fered them to the moon if only he could have 
found life there and a government with whom 
to negotiate. 
The GATT pessimists thought of the GATT 
process of trade negotiations as less effective 
and rapid than the FTA approach to worldwide 
trade liberalization. But that is a hasty and ill- 
considered view. A comparison of the two 
processes of trade liberalization is surprising. It 
turns out that the problems that plague the one 
also afflict the other. As the economists Ber- 
nard Hoekman and Michael Leidy have pointed 
out, the holes (areas left out) and the loopholes 
(areas where the disciplines of free trade are 
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avoided) are practically identical in either case. 
As for slowness, consider the European Com- 
munity: The process began in 1957, with the 
Treaty of Rome pledge to eliminate trade bar- 
riers as required by GATT Article 24. As of 
1993, it still has not succeeded-not exactly a 
record of alacrity. The NAFTA talks, which aim 
to bring together only three countries, have 
taken nearly a decade, while the Uruguay 
Round, with 112 countries participating, has so 
far taken only seven years. 
Nonetheless, the nonregional ETA approach 
embraced by Brock became the U.S. trade 
policy in the early 1980s, downgrading the 
option of sticking to multilateralism despite its 
revival at the Uruguay Round. Yet, down the 
road, that policy turned into the narrow region- 
al FTA option that is the least attractive of those 
available. Some of the blame lies with the U.S. 
Treasury Department, which was able to cap- 
ture the FTA idea for its own purposes, offering 
preferential trade to South America in lieu of 
debt relief. When the South Americans re- 
sponded positively, the State Department mus- 
cled in, turning the trade initiative into a for- 
eign policy initiative and making it an integral 
part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initia- 
tive. That program harked back to President 
John Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, except 
that the latter did not include an offer of re- 
gional FTAs because the United States was cor- 
rectly devoted to multilateralism at the time. 
The effect of that narrower vision has been 
to encourage the notion that the United States 
is interested in trade regionalism no matter 
how strong its professed commitment o multi- 
lateralism. Since the United States also recog- 
nizes its vital trade interests in the rapidly ex- 
panding markets of the Far East, it has found 
itself in an awkward position. George Bush's 
secretary of state, James Baker, was trying to 
convince the Asian countries not to form their 
own Japan-centered FTA even as he worked on 
the NAFTA and its exclusive extension to the 
south-an incoherent position that argues that 
what is good for me is not good for you. 
Many have even tried to convince themselves 
that an Asian trade bloc is unlikely because the 
Asian countries will not soon forget Japan's 
wartime cruelties--conveniently forgetting that 
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other countries have learned to live with and 
profit from Germany despite the unparalleled 
crimes of the Holocaust. The profit motive can 
help numb the grey cells of memory. 
Indeed, few would have thought that anti- 
Yanqui sentiments would so quickly evaporate 
from the Mexican scene, allowing President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari's splendid team to 
hitch Mexico's economic destiny to America's. 
Salinas turned on its head Porfirio Diaz's fa- 
mous dictum: "Poor Mexico, so far from God 
and so near the United States." 
But if the United States pushes FTAs only 
southward, it will certainly invite a defensive, if 
not retaliatory, bloc in Asia. Divisions will be 
sharpened and the world economy fragmented 
into four blocs: an expanded EC, a NAFTA 
extended to the Americas, a Japan-centered 
Asian bloc, and a marginalized group of devel- 
oping countries, many with low incomes and 
only just turning to export-oriented strategies. 
We should not favor that scenario. 
If the United States continues to pursue 
FTAs, the least it can do is to return to the 
Brock agenda, to the vision of the 1960s North 
Atlantic initiative. That would mean developing 
a new strategy of openness before adding any 
new members, especially from South America. 
Such a policy would have to be unambigu- 
ously stated and diplomatically credible. Nego- 
tiations to add one or more non-hemispheric 
countries before adding hemispheric ones 
would help. Then again, if U.S. domestic poli- 
tics drives America farther south, well beyond 
the Rio Grande, Canada could be explicitly 
encouraged to seek out new NAFTA members 
from the British Commonwealth, countries to 
which Canada surely has stronger economic 
and historical links. Indeed, instead of playing 
the complaisant junior partner in NAFTA, Can- 
ada could itself play a leadership role; prime 
ministers like Lester Pearson and Pierre Tru- 
deau did not shy away from the world stage. 
But all that is more readily urged than under- 
taken. Clayton Yeutter, the former USTR who 
negotiated the U.S.-Canadian agreement, has 
candidly described the enormous difficulties of 
such talks. Then again, the politics of pushing 
the next agreement hrough Congress could be 
quite a challenge. Imagine what would happen 
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if the Congress were considering an FTA with 
India---or with Japan. 
Yet many analysts seem drawn to FTA blocs, 
to a power-political conception of trade that 
sees the world as a jigsaw puzzle. Some call for 
a U.S.-Japanese Pacific free trade area, with the 
two economic superpowers bringing along their 
respective regions to provide a counterweight 
to the enlarging EC. In turn, taking a cue from 
Margaret Thatcher-the irrepressible Atlan- 
ticist-and from the Japanophobes, columnist 
Charles Krauthammer recently argued that the 
three NAFTA countries should free up trade 
with the EC instead. "A transatlantic free-trade 
zone would signal Japan that if it had thoughts 
of creating a rival Asian bloc or did not modify 
its predatory drive for market dominance, it 
might find itself shut out of the new world 
economic order," he wrote in Time. And thus 
each of us will act out our own fantasies, seek- 
ing allies against imagined adversaries, lining up 
our preferred blocs against the others, and 
vying for political attention and action. 
The more deeply one thinks about the issue, 
and about the basic choice between multilater- 
alism and FTAs as ways of bringing down trade 
barriers worldwide, the more disenchanted one 
is likely to be about the latter. Even the popu- 
lar notion that the two processes and policies 
can coexist-the 
"GATT-plus" proposition-and 
even be benignly symbiotic, is too simplistic. 
Lobbying support and political energies can 
readily be diverted to preferential trading ar- 
rangements such as FTAs, where privileged 
access to markets is obtained at the expense of 
outside competitors (such as the EC and Japan 
in NAFTA). That deprives the multilateral sys- 
tem of the support it needs to survive, let alone 
be conducive to further trade liberalization. 
The wisest option for the Clinton administra- 
tion, therefore, is to move NAFTA with Mexico 
through Congress, conclude the Uruguay 
Round, and then focus exclusively on the multi- 
lateral trading regime of GATT. Will the ad- 
ministration rise to that challenge or, in choos- 
ing the least attractive option of regional FTAs, 
continue the sorry spectacle of thoughtless 
trading choices? 
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